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Kroger v. Owen Equipment & Erection Company I
Geraldine Kroger, an Iowa citizen, brought a diversity action in fed-
eral district court for the wrongful death of her husband against the
Omaha Public Power District (hereafter OPPD), a Nebraska corporation.
OPPD filed a third-party complaint 2 against the Owen Equipment and
Erection Company (hereafter Owen). Plaintiff then amended her com-
plaint to assert a claim directly against the third-party defendant Owen, 3
describing it as "a Nebraska corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Nebraska." Owen's answer consisted of an admission that Owen
was incorporated under the laws of Nebraska and a general denial of all
other allegations. 4
Before trial OPPD was granted a motion for summary judgment
and was dismissed from the lawsuit. The only remaining parties were the
plaintiff, an Iowa citizen, and the third-party defendant Owen, ostensibly
a Nebraska corporation. Three days into the trial, Owen's witness tes-
tified that Owen's principal place of business was in Iowa. Owen then
requested leave to amend its answer to assert lack of subject matter
1. 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides in part:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a
third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him .... The person
served with the summons and third-party complaint, hereinafter called
the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-party
plaintiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 ....
3. Id. "The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff .... "But see FED. R. Cxv. P. 82,
note 13 infra.
4. The court concluded that Owen's general denial failed to raise the de-
fense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of its failure to comply with
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b) which provides in part that "[w]hen a pleader intends in
good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify
so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder."
310
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jurisdiction based on a lack of diversity between the parties. The district
court rejected this challenge to its jurisdiction. It held that although no
independent basis of jurisdiction existed as to the third-party defendant
Owen, it nevertheless had discretion under United Mine Workers v- Gibbs 5
to exercise its judicial power over the case. A judgment ultimately was
entered for the plaintiff. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Kroger presents several problems that have plagued the federal
courts for years. The first and most important is whether independent,
grounds of subject matter jurisdiction are required to support a plain-
tiff's claim against a third-party defendant impleaded under federal rule
14. The second problem is what effect, if any, a pretrial disposal of the
primary claim has upon the court's jurisdiction over an ancillary claim.
The final problem concerns what action a district court may take when
parties to a lawsuit have concealed information or otherwise misled the
court as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
In Kroger the Eighth Circuit became the first to adopt the minority
view that no independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction is required
to support a plaintiff's claim against a third-party defendant brought
into the lawsuit through rule 14.6 The clear weight of authority is to
the contrary. 7 Therefore, the future effect of the Kroger decision will
rest largely upon the strength of the reasoning supporting it.
5. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
6. Prior to the Kroger decision, there were several district court cases sup-
porting the minority view. Hadinger v. Bentley Laboratories, Inc., 427 F. Supp.
994 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Hood v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 412 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.
Miss. 1976); CCF Indus. Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1259
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697 (D.C. Kan.
1975); Buresch v. American LaFrance, 290 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Myer
v. Lyford, 2 F.R.D. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1942); Malkin v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp.
948 (D.C. Md. 1941). See also Davis v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.
Mich. 1972); Olson v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 489 (D.C. Neb. 1965).
7. Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); Saalfrank v.
O'Daniel, 533 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Saalfrank v. Parkview
Memorial Hosp., 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Parker v. W.W. Moore & Sons, Inc., 528
F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1975); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890
(4th Cir. 1972); Friend v. Middle Atl. Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1946);
Ayoub v. Helm's Express, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Joseph v.
Chrysler Corp., 61 F.R.D. 347 (W.D. Pa. 1973), affd mem., 513 F.2d 626 (3d Cir.
1975); Pasternack v. Dalo, 17 F.R.D. 420 (W.D. Pa. 1955); Welder v. Washington
Temperance Ass'n, 16 F.R.D. 18 (D.C. Minn. 1954); McDonald v. Dykes, 6
F.R.D. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1947), aff'd mem., 163 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1947); Hoskie v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 305 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). See also Rosario v. Ameri-
can Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. Rosario v. United States, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); McPherson v. Hoffman, 275
F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960); Patton v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 197 F.2d 732 (3d Cir.
1952); Mickelic v. United States Postal Serv., 367 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Pa. 1973);
Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Corbi v.
United States, 298 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Palumbo v. Western Maryland
Ry., 271 F. Supp. 361 (D.C. Md. 1967).
1978]
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The major impetus behind the minority view, which has won it
widespread support among commentators," is that it will promote judi-
cial convenience and economy through the avoidance of piecemeal liti-
gation.9 Despite this desirable result, eight cases" in five different
courts of appeals" have refused to treat a plaintiff's claim against a
third-party defendant as being ancillary to the original claim.
The reason supporting the majority view was stated in Friend v.
Middle Atlantic Transportation Company: 12 "Notwithstanding the un-
doubted convenience of extensive joinder in cases such as this, we must
observe the established boundaries of federal jurisdiction, which the
rules do not enlarge." 13 The objective of the court in Kroger was to
determine the outermost limits of those boundaries.14
In searching for the limits of its jurisdiction the Kroger court, like
most of the post-Gibbs opinions supporting the minority view,'- relied
heavily upon the language of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs ' and Profes-
sor Moore's treatise on federal practice.' 7 For this reason Kroger can be
evaluated only through a careful reading of Gibbs and a critical look at
Professor Moore's trenchant argument in favor of the minority view.
In attempting to apply Gibbs to the Kroger case, one is at first con-
fronted with the dissimilarity in the factual settings of the two cases. In
Gibbs the plaintiff brought suit against the United Mine Workers pur-
suant to a federal statute. Because the union was brought before the
federal court on a valid federal claim, the Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff's state claim against the union was within the jurisdictional
power of the district court, even though that claim was not indepen-
dently cognizable in a federal court. Gibbs thus involved what properly is
termed "pendent jurisdiction," i.e., the joinder in the same action of state
and federal claims. 18 Kroger, on the other hand, concerned what is
8. See, e.g., 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.27 [1] (2d ed. 1974); Fraser,
Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 41
(1963); Holtzoff, Entry of Additional Parties in a Civil Action, 31 F.R.D. 101, 110
(1962); Note, Rule 14 Claims and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 57 VA. L. REv. 265 (1971).
9. See, e.g., Buresch v. American LaFrance, 290 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Pa.
1968); Malkin v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948 (D.C. Md. 1941).
10. See cases cited note 7 supra.
11. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have denied ex-
tending ancillary jurisdiction to plaintiffs' claims against third-party defendants
on at least one occasion. See cases cited note 7 supra.
12. 153 F.2d 778, 779 (2d Cir. 1946).
13. The court cited FED. R. Civ. P. 82 which provides: "These rules shall not
be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district
courts .... "
14. 558 F.2d at 420.
15. E.g., Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697 (D.C. Kan.
1975); Davis v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
16. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
17. 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.271] (2d ed. 1974).
18. See C. WRIGHT, LAW oF FEDERAL COURTS 75 (3d ed. 1976).
[Vol. 43312
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known as "ancillary jurisdiction," a much broader concept which includes
the joinder of parties.' 9 Although it has been said that there are no
practical differences between the two concepts,20 the factual distinctions
are relevant. Kroger was a diversity case, not a federal question case as
was Gibbs. Moreover, in Gibbs the original claim as well as the pendent
claim involved the same two parties. In Kroger, however, the original
claim was between plaintiff and OPPD, while the ancillary claim was
between plaintiff and Owen. Thus, unlike Gibbs, there were no indepen-
dent grounds of jurisdiction between the two parties in question.
Despite factual disparity, the broad language in Gibbs has been relied
upon by several district courts to extend ancillary jurisdiction to plain-
tiffs' claims against third-party defendants. 21 According to Professor
Moore, "[p]roperly read, United Mine Workers reemphasizes the funda-
mental principle that a federal court has jurisdictional power to adjudicate
the whole case, i.e., all claims state or federal, which derive from a com-
mon nucleus of operative facts." 22 This broad view, on which the
majority in Kroger relied, does not seem tenable in the light of the deci-
sions in Zahn v. International Paper Co.23 and Aldinger v. Howard.2 4 In
both of those recent Supreme Court cases, claims arising from the same
"common nucleus of operative facts" as the primary claim were held to
be beyond the jurisdictional reach of the federal courts despite the pre-
sence of strong considerations of judicial economy and convenience.
Both decisions were based squarely upon the principle that congressional
intent had precluded federal jurisdiction.2 5
In Aldinger the Court pointed out that analysis must go beyond the
vague article III considerations addressed in Gibbs. In reaching this con-
clusion the Court stated:
19. Id. at 75 n.27.
20. Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two
Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1263 (1975).
21. See cases cited note 15 supra.
22. 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.27 [1], at 569 (2d ed. 1974) (author's
emphasis).
23. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). In Zahn the owners of lakefront property brought a
class action suit for damages caused by defendant's discharge of inadequately
treated waste into the lake. Although the petitioners argued that ancillary juris-
diction would allow them to represent the interests of all parties, even though
some of the members of the class did not have claims amounting to $10,000, the
majority opinion did not mention ancillary jurisdiction. Instead, the majority
opinion placed great emphasis on the congressional reenactment of 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) without modification of the "matter in controversy" phrase. The Court
pointed out that Congress had reenacted the statute in the face of numerous
court decisions strictly construing the phrase. Thus, the Court found that Con-
gress had intended that each claim meet the required jurisdictional amount. For
a discussion of the Zahn case see Adams, Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Closing
the Doors to the Federal Courts, 39 Mo. L. REv. 447 (1974).
24. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
25. Accord, Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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Gibbs and its lineal ancestor, Osborn, were couched in terms of
Art. III's grant of judicial power .... But the question whether
jurisdiction over the instant suit [exists] ... turns initially, not
on the general language in Art. III ... but upon deductions
which can be drawn from congressional statutes as to whether
Congress wanted to grant this sort of jurisdiction to federal
courts.
26
Thus, although it is recognized that Congress may be able to grant
federal courts the power to hear claims based upon minimum diversity, 27
the courts currently are bound by 28 U.S.C. section 1332 (1970) which
requires complete diversity.28 Kroger's reliance on Gibbs, which merely
stated the parameters of the federal courts' article III power, 29 was in-
appropriate in light of the congressional statement in section 1332 that
each and every plaintiff must be diverse to each and every defendant.
It is submitted that the proper analysis of an ancillary jurisdiction
case such as Kroger requires an initial consideration of article III of the
Constitution. If the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction is within the general
bounds of article III, there must be further inquiry into section 1332 to
determine whether Congress has forbidden such jurisdictional power. 30
Kroger did not take the second step of this analysis. As a result the court
failed to address the question of congressional intent.
In addition to relying on Professor Moore's interpretation of Gibbs,
the court in Kroger placed considerable reliance upon his criticism of the
majority rationale. 31 The arguments most frequently mentioned in
favor of the majority view were summarized in Kenrose Manufacturing Co.
v. Fred Whitaker Co.: 32
(1) [P]laintiff should not be allowed, by an indirect route, to
sue a co-citizen under diversity jurisdiction when he is not
permitted to sue that party directly; "
26. 427 U.S. at 13-17. For a suggested standard for determining congres-
sional intent see Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 COLUM.
L. REv. 127, 146-47 (1977).
27. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
28. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 575 (1806).
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases ... arising under ... the Laws of the United States .... " Gibbs sought
only to determine the breadth of the term "Cases." The Court concluded that
insofar as article III was concerned, a federal claim joined with a state claim
against the same defendant was but one constitutional "Case." For a discussion of
how Aldinger has affected Gibbs, see Comment, supra note 26, at 146-47.
30. See.558 F.2d at 431 (Bright, J., dissenting); Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546
F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); Comment, supra note 26, at 140-41; Note, Supreme
Court Says No to Pendent Parties-At Least This Time, 38 U. Prrr. L. REv. 395,
410-16 (1976).
31. 558 F.2d at 427 n.37.
32. 512 F.2d 890, 893-94 (4th Cir. 1972).
33. Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); McPherson v.
Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960); Palumbo v. Western Md. Ry., 271 F.
(Vol. 43314
5
Tomlinson: Tomlinson: Civil Procedure--Ancillary Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Claims
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
1978] RECENT CASES 315
(2) the majority rule prevents collusion between plaintiff and
defendant to obtain jurisdiction over a party who would
otherwise not be within the court's reach; 
3 4
(3) the rule which generally does not require diversity as be-
tween plaintiff and the third-party defendant proceeds on
the assumption that the plaintiff is seeking no relief against
the third-party defendant; 35 and
(4) federal dockets are so overcrowded that the federal courts
should not reach out for state based litigation. 36
In response to the first point Professor Moore took the position that
because it is the defendant's "choice" to implead a third party, and not the
decision of the plaintiff, considerations of judicial economy and conveni-
ence may dictate that the court dispose of the whole case.37 Moore also
concluded that the second justification for the majority rule is too rigid,
and that the possibility of collusion should be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis by the application of 28 U.S.C. section 1359 (1970), 3 8 which
forbids collusive joinder to invoke jurisdiction. Thus, Professor Moore
contended that only in cases where collusion is actually present should
the court be deprived of its discretionary power to retain jurisdiction
over ancillary claims.39
Unfortunately, the cases stating the minority view have overem-
phasized the importance of the collusion argument, thus providing
themselves with a convenient avenue of attack upon what they have
deemed to be the basis of the majority rationale. What would appear to
be the true majority view was stated in Palumbo v. Western Maryland Rail-
way: 41
Supp. 361 (D.C. Md. 1967); Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 305
(E.D.N.Y. 1941).
34. E.g., Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 305 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
35. See, e.g., Stemler v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1965). Professor Moore
argued that ancillary jurisdiction is broad enough to encompass both the third-
party complaint and plaintiff's action against the third-party. 3 MooRf's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE § 14.27 [1], at 571 (2d ed. 1974). His view, however, is based
upon a broad interpretation of Gibbs which no longer appears tenable. See text
accompanying notes 22-30 supra.
36. E.g., Ayoub v. Helm's Express, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
37. 3 MooR's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.27 [1], at 570-71 (2d ed. 1974).
38. Section 1359 provides: "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a
civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly
or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."
39. Accord, Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697 (D.C. Kan.
1975); Davis v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Fraser, supra
note 8, at 42; Note, supra note 8 at 275.
40. Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697, 702 (D.C. Kan.
1975). Judge Rogers, in defending his rejection of the majority view, stated:
"The first and foremost argument against allowing a plaintiff to assert a claim
directly against a third-party defendant is that this might allow a plaintiff to
'collusively' obtain jurisdiction over a party that he could not sue directly."
41. 271 F. Supp. 361, 362 (D.C. Md. 1967) (emphasis added).
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Fear of collusion is not the principal argument supporting the
majority rule. Collusion between the plaintiff and the original defen-
dant is not necessary. Wherever the law provides for contribution
among joint tortfeasors, or a defendant has a possible claim for
indemnity, the defendant will ordinarily file a third-party com-
plaint, giving plaintiff the opportunity to assert a claim against
the third-party defendant.
These observations go to the heart of the problem. If a plaintiff can
compel a defendant, through the practical consideration of inconsistent
judgments and expensive relitigation, to deliver the third-party defen-
dant into the judicial grasp of the plaintiff, then the will of Congress, as
expressed by section 1332, has been held for naught. For example if
"Missouri Consumer" (MC) is injured by a defective product which was
manufactured by "Missouri Manufacturer" (MM), but sold to MC in Il-
linois by "Illinois Retailer" (IR), MC can defeat section 1332 under the
doctrine in Kroger. Although MC could not sue MM alone in federal
court, nor join MM and IR in his original complaint, he can sue IR in
federal court (possibly even in Missouri). If IR does not implead MM
and assert his claim for indemnity, he may fail in his later claim against
MM and be left to bear the burden of the judgment alone. With this
possibility of being left singularly liable on a large products liability
claim, it is doubtful that IR will perceive that he has the "choice" re-
ferred to by Professor Moore. 42 Instead IR probably will implead MM
as a third-party defendant. Under Kroger, MC then can amend his com-
plaint and assert against MM the very claims he could not have asserted
directly. Moreover, notwithstanding the blatant avoidance of the re-
quirements of section 1332, it would appear that section 1359 43 would
be of little help. There is clearly no collusion, and though section 1359
also precludes parties "improperly" made or joined, it is doubtful the
courts could apply the statute where there is nothing overtly improper
about the plaintiff's conduct.
At this point it is not unreasonable to query how the conclusion that
a plaintiff's claim against a third-party defendant should not be ancillary
can be reconciled with what now appears to be a substantial minority
view that a third-party defendant's claim against the original plaintiff
should be treated as ancillary. 44 Indeed, the majority in Kroger seemed
impressed by this apparent incongruity. As stated in Revere Copper &
Brass Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.: "the two situations are the con-
verse of each other only superficially and there are differences which
militate against identical treatment."4 5
42. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
43. See note 38 supra.
44. See generally Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed. 402 (1972).
45. 426 F.2d 709, 716 (5th Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 43316
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One of the obvious differences was pointed out in Revere: 46
[T]he plaintiff has the option of selecting the forum where he
believes he can most effectively assert his claims, he has not
been involuntarily brought to a forum, faced with the prospect
of defending himself as best he can under the rules that forum
provides, or defending himself not at all.
Bearing in mind that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction has developed
to a large extent to prevent unfairness, 47 it is clear that the third-party
defendant, involuntarily brought before the court, should have a
stronger argument for ancillary jurisdiction than the plaintiff who chose
the forum.
Fairness alone, however, is not the only distinction. Allowing the
plaintiff to state a claim against a third-party defendant without requir-
ing independent grounds for jurisdiction would seem much closer to
what Congress has forbidden than permitting under the same cir-
cumstances a claim by the third-party defendant against the plaintiff.
Virtually all would agree that a plaintiff could not sue one defendant,
then later amend to add a second non-diverse defendant on the grounds
that the second claim is ancillary to the first.48 As pointed out earlier,
however, the same result can be achieved under the rule in Kroger by a
plaintiff who is fortunate enough to have an out-of-state defendant who
has a right to contribution or indemnity against an in-state defendant.
The court in Kroger should not have considered the factors of judi-
cial efficiency, convenience, and fairness to the parties until it first de-
termined whether Congress had precluded the exercise of jurisdiction. 49
It should not be ignored that Congress repeatedly has reduced the juris-
diction of federal courts in diversity cases, both by increasing jurisdic-
tional amounts and by restricting diversity requirements.5" It has been
said that the policy of Congress is to force litigants to settle their claims
in state courts whenever they cannot meet the jurisdictional require-
ments.5 1 This policy is intended to reflect a deference for the indepen-
46. Id.
47. See generally Comment, supra note 20; Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 48 IoWA L. REv. 383, 384-85 (1963).
48. But see Wittersheim v. General Transp. Servs., Inc., 378 F. Supp. 762
(E.D. Va. 1974) (plaintiff allowed to join a non-diverse defendant in a diversity
case). Note, however, the sharp criticism given this case in Parker v. W.W. Moore
& Sons, Inc., 528 F.2d 764, 766 (4th Cir. 1975).
49. See Note, supra note 30, at 416.
50. DISTRICT COURTS-JURISDICTION-DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP-AMOUNT
IN CONTROVERSY, S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 3099, 3124-26; FEDERAL JURISDICTION-DIVERSITY OF
CITIZENSHIP, S. REP. No. 1308, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted iti [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2778.
51. See, e.g., Sturgeon v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 143 F.2d 819, 821 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944).
317RECENT CASES1978]
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dence of state courts,52 as well as the practical need to reduce federal
court caseloads. 53 Since Strawbridge v. Curtiss 54 it has been held that the
diversity statute requires complete diversity. Despite criticism, Congress
has allowed that requirement to remain. The statutory and public policy
arguments behind the diversity doctrine seem equally applicable to situ-
ations where a plaintiff seeks to assert a claim directly against a third-
party defendant.55 Thus, the majority in Kroger has chosen to make
available to plaintiffs the means to avoid the congressional requirement
of complete diversity even though, in the vast majority of cases, the con-
venience purportedly sought by the plaintiff is available in a state forum,
often in the courts of his own state.
Setting aside for a moment the arguments regarding congressional
intent, assume that the majority had considered the ramifications of sec-
tion 1332, and had concluded that Congress has not precluded the exer-
cise of ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims against third-party de-
fendants. Given this result, it still would be necessary to consider what
effect, if any, the dismissal before trial of the primary claim had upon
the court's discretion to retain the case. In answering this question the
majority stated:
Defendant Owen attacks the applicability of this doctrine [an-
cillary jurisdiction] to the case at bar, asserting that the dismis-
sal of the plaintiff's claim against OPPD before trial limits the
discretion of the District Court. We do not so conclude. It is but
one factor, among many others, to be considered.5 6
In support of its conclusion, the court relied upon the general prin-
ciple that a federal court may use its discretion in deciding whether to
retain an ancillary claim after disposition of the primary claim. 57 As the
court observed, the policy arguments for retaining jurisdiction over an-
cillary claims in other circumstances are equally applicable to a plaintiff's
claim against third-party defendants.5 8 The Gibbs case, however,
suggested a different result: "Certainly, if the federal claims are dis-
missed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional
sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well." 59  The continued
52. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).
53. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969).
54. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 575 (1806).
55. Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636, 638 (5th Cir. 1977).
56. 558 F.2d at 426.
57. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §
1444, at 234-37 (1971).
58. Fairness to the parties is the primary rationale behind retaining jurisdic-
tion. A contrary view would require ancillary claims to be asserted at the risk that
they later may be dismissed after they are barred by the statute of limitations, or
after expensive trial preparation. Such a policy would defeat the value of ancil-
lary jurisdiction.
59. 383 U.S. at 726.
[Vol. 43318
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validity of the Gibbs dictum was questioned seriously, however, in Rosado
V. Wyman. 60 In Rosado the Court refused to apply the Gibbs dictum to a
pendent state claim, even though the primary claim had been dismissed
as moot prior to trial. Instead, the court stated:
We are not willing to defeat the commonsense policy of pen-
dent jurisdiction-the conservation of judicial energy and the
avoidance of multiplicity of litigation-by a conceptual ap-
proach that would require jurisdiction over the primary claim
at all stages as a prerequisite to resolution of the pendent
claim.6
1
Thus, the Kroger court was probably correct in concluding that the
retention of the ancillary claim remained discretionary after the disposi-
tion of the primary claim. Nevertheless, the analysis should not stop
there. The factors of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness, men-
tioned in Gibbs, 62 are still relevant.6 3 Of course, because of Owen's
delay in raising the defense, there hardly could be a stronger case for
retaining jurisdiction than was presented in Kroger. If Owen had raised
the defense immediately upon dismissal, however, it is doubtful that the
case would have been retained unless, at that time, the state statute of
limitations already had run. As a general rule, because there is usually
no hardship present, the ancillary claim will be dismissed if the primary
claim is disposed of before trial.64
The last issue presented by the Kroger case is the propriety of the
court's actions against a party to a lawsuit who has concealed facts or
otherwise misled the court as to the existence of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. The view of the vast majority, as expressed by federal rule 12,65 is
that the court must dismiss the case whenever it appears that the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction.66 There is some authority, however,
for the proposition that where one party has misled the court as to the
existence of jurisdiction and dismissal would result in severe hardship for
the innocent party, the court may refuse to hear belated challenges to its
60. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
61. Id. at 405.
62. 383 U.S. at 726.
63. See Note, supra note 30, at 416.
64. For a good discussion of the treatment of ancillary claims after the dis-
posal of the primary claim, see Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction -Rule 14-Disposition
of Third Party Claim When the Primary Claim Has Been Dismissed, 23 S.C.L. REV. 261
(1971).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (3) provides: "Whenever it appears by suggestion of
the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the
court shall dismiss the action."
66. See generally 2A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.23, at 2451-61 (2d ed.
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jurisdiction.6 7 This minority approach sometimes has been referred to
as "jurisdiction by estoppel." 68
The latter portion of the Kroger opinion, which discusses Owen's
concealment of its principal place of business, is confusing in that the
court discussed two different types of estoppel. One type, which the
court apparently adopted, is that expressed in Murphy v. Kodz.69 The
court in Murphy stated that when a party fails to bring to the court's
attention factors which the court normally would consider in exercising
discretion over ancillary or pendent claims, that party is estopped from
claiming that the trial court abused its discretion. Although the majority
in Kroger concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion,7 0
the majority opinion nevertheless went on to say that Owen could not
have challenged the trial court's decision even if there had been an
abuse of discretion. 71
The second type of estoppel the majority refers to is like that ex-
pressed in Di Frischia v. New York Central Railroad Company.72 The basic
concept of the jurisdiction by estoppel rule is that, even though there is
absolutely no basis for federal jurisdiction, a federal court may retain a
case, for the purpose of preventing injustice, if the party moving for
dismissal has admitted the existence of jurisdiction in his pleadings, 73 or
in a stipulation,74 or perhaps even where the party attempting to raise
the defense has been grossly negligent in failing to disclose facts negat-
ing the existence of jurisdiction.75 If the court had adopted the juris-
diction by estoppel rule as the ratio decidendi, the same result could have
been achieved without reliance on Gibbs, ancillary jurisdiction, or Murphy.
The court concluded at the beginning of the opinion that Owen's answer
to the plaintiff's amended complaint was so misleading as to amount to
an admission.76  The jurisdiction by estoppel rule simply would have
deprived Owen of the opportunity to disprove what had been admitted
67. See Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960);
Greenbaum v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Klee v.
Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
68. Stephens, Estoppel to Deny Federal Jurisdiction-Klee and Di Frischia Break
Ground, 68 DICK. L. REv. 39 (1963).
69. 351 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1965). For a critical discussion of Murphy see 38
U. COLO. L. REv. 420 (1966).
70. 558 F.2d at 427.
71. Not only was this dictum unnecessary, it also appears unsound. In the
Gibbs opinion the court made it clear that "the issue whether pendent jurisdiction
has been properly assumed is one which remains open throughout the litiga-
tion." 383 U.S. at 727.
72. 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960). See Stephens, supra note 68; Note, Federal
Procedure-Jurisdiction Conferred By Stipulation, 15 U. MIAMI L. REV. 315 (1961);
Note, Federal Court Allowance of Tardy Disproof of Diversity Held to be Abuse of Dis-
cretion, 7 UTAH L. REv. 258 (1960).
73. Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
74. Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960).
75. See Greenbaum v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
76. 558 F.2d at 419.
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in the pleadings.7 7 Although it quoted at length from Di Frischia and
commentators supporting the jurisdiction by estoppel approach, the
court did not make it clear whether it relied on jurisdiction by estoppel
as an alternative ground for its decision. It appears likely that the court's
reference to Di Frischia was merely to illustrate a point-judicial fair-
ness. 
78
The dissent suggested, as an alternative to jurisdiction by estoppel,
that cases such as this could be dealt with by assessing costs and reasona-
ble attorney's fees against the offending party.7 9  Of course if the dis-
sent is wrong about the operation of Iowa's statute of limitations "saving"
statute,8 0 it would be of little consolation to the plaintiff that she had
been awarded costs, but deprived of a $234,000 judgment.
The Kroger court may have been in error on two counts. The first
was in failing to give greater consideration to the concept of jurisdiction
by estoppel. Although this doctrine has been criticized and has received
little following, at least it would have met the problem directly and av-
oided all discussion of ancillary jurisdiction. In addition the court may
have been able to fashion a sufficiently restrictive jurisdiction by estoppel
rule to prevent the rule's future abuse, rather than establishing a broad
ancillary jurisdiction rule which may be subject to abuse in situations far
removed from the facts in Kroger. The second error may have been in
relying solely on Gibbs in analyzing whether ancillary jurisdiction could
be applied properly to a plaintiff's claim against a third-party defendant.
Because Gibbs only mapped the boundaries of article III jurisdiction, the
Kroger court failed to take into account congressional limitations on
jurisdiction as required by Aldinger. If this inquiry had been made, the
court may have discovered that section 1332 precludes the exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction in this case.
WILBUR L. TOMLINSON
77. Before the jurisdiction by estoppel rule could have been applied, the
court would have had to make a determination whether the plaintiff's claim
against Owen was in fact barred by the statute of limitations. In all three cases
applying the jurisdiction by estoppel rule, the plaintiff would have been deprived
of his cause of action by the dismissal. It is unlikely that anything less than that
type of hardship would justify the application of the doctrine.
78. The court may have avoided resting the decision on jurisdiction by es-
toppel because of the factual distinctions between Kroger and Di Frischia. In Di
Frischia it was clear that the defendant knew diversity was lacking because coun-
sel had filed a motion to dismiss and then shortly thereafter filed a stipulation
admitting diversity. In Kroger, on the other hand, it is not clear if Owen was
aware of the lack of diversity. This distinction, however, would not seem ample
to support a contrary result. The plaintiff had alleged unequivocally that Owen's
principal place of business was in Nebraska. In responding to the plaintiff's
complaint, Owen had at its disposal all the facts needed to determine whether
there was any reason to question the diversity averment. See Greenbaum v.
United States, 360 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
79. 558 F.2d at 432.
80. IOWA CODE § 614.10 (1977).
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